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Abstract 
Awareness of emotion is a central component of human life and adaptive functioning. 
Emotional knowledge about one’s own and other’s emotional experience are central features 
of mental health and may be characteristic of therapeutic processes leading to good outcome. 
Clients with personality disorders (PD) often lack in their ability to access and accept 
emotional experiences, or to reflect on emotion and use it in adaptive ways; instead, they tend 
to process emotional information on more shallow levels. The present theoretical and clinical 
review discusses self-knowledge, and lack thereof, in personality disorders, from an emotion-
focused perspective. A first section differentiates between two fundamental types of meaning 
construction processing, (a) bottom-up processing of emotion awareness, (b) top-down 
processing. These are combined in a constructive process, generating new meaning related 
with emotion. The second section describes, from an integrative therapy perspective, how 
self-knowledge may be facilitated in psychotherapy by the client-therapist interaction, by 
mainly focusing on implicit and non-verbal components of the interaction. A subsequent 
section discusses lack of awareness of one’s own emotions in the construction of meaning 
associated with personality disorders, by reviewing literature from psychopathology and 
psychotherapy research. The final section describes first studies describing change occurring 
in constructing emotional self-knowledge, as correlate of treatment. The concepts of the 
review are illustrated throughout using three clinical cases of PD treated by the first author: a 
client with borderline personality disorder, a client with narcissistic personality disorder, and 
a client with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. 
 
 
Key-Words: Emotion; Self-Knowledge; Personality Disorders; Emotional Processing; 
Awareness; Insight; Experiential 
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN PERSONALITY DISORDERS:  
AN EMOTION-FOCUSED PERSPECTIVE 
“...le coeur a des raisons que la raison ne connaît pas » 
Blaise Pascal 
Introduction 
Emotion is a central force in human life. It orients our daily choices, our actions and 
our thinking. It is the primary force contributing to the individual’s adaptation (Frijda, 1986) 
and helps individuals to know what they really want. The processes of accessing – a process 
of actual feeling by the client in the room –, becoming aware of, staying with, regulating, and 
differentiating emotions are described as central components of several forms of 
psychotherapy (Fosha, 2000; Greenberg, 2002; Magnavita, 2006). Extracting vital adaptive 
information from experienced emotions – knowing oneself from one’s emotion – is a 
constructive process contributing to stronger identities, more stable relationships and better 
functioning. Therefore, change in emotional knowledge has the potential of explaining the 
effects of different kinds of psychotherapies, as well as formulating a dynamic and 
“experience-near” theory of mental disorders. Greenberg (2002) has argued that nuanced and 
differentiated awareness of one’s own emotions contributes to the process of emotion 
transformation, where the client’s actual emotion is changed with another emotion. We argue 
that emotional self-knowledge is a key component of this process and might be particularly 
relevant in the study and treatment of personality disorders. In this, our thesis goes further 
than the study of the incapacity of identifying, labeling and communicating emotions in 
certain clients, described with the notion of alexithymia (Nemiah, Freyberg, & Sifneos, 1976). 
We propose a more complex theoretical and clinical account of how emotional self-
knowledge is constructed in psychotherapy and what in this process of construction may be 
particularly difficult in clients with personality disorders.  
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As such, the present paper aims at synthesizing literature related to emotional self-
knowledge in treatments for personality disorders, formulated from an integrative emotion-
focused perspective. Firstly, we will describe two different types of processes of meaning 
construction, then how they can be fostered in a therapeutic context, then identify emotion 
components contributing to emotional self-knowledge which may be flawed in clients with 
PD and, finally, describe change in these components as a correlate – and potential 
mechanism – of treatment. The concepts will be illustrated by using three case examples of 
clients presenting with different personality disorders, undergoing three different types of 
treatments. 
Three Case Studies 
Before elaborating the concepts related to self-knowledge from an emotion-focused 
perspective, we shortly present three cases to be used for illustration. These clients have 
accepted that their data be used for publication and all identifying personal details are either 
changed or omitted. In order to save space, we opt for a succinct presentation of each case, 
leaving more room for elaboration and discussion of the concepts. All three treatments were 
conducted by the first author. 
Case number one: Sara. Sara was a 50-year old client suffering from borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) and co-morbid alcohol abuse. This case was presented by Kramer 
and Pascual-Leone (2012). Sara received a two year-long emotion-focused therapy, using 
intensive Gestalt-type chairwork adapted for problems related with personality disorders (Pos 
& Greenberg, 2012; Warwar, Links, Greenberg, & Bergmans, 2008). Her main problem was 
her difficulty with asserting herself in interpersonal relationships, resulting in a high level of 
inner tension and arousal, which was initially “vented” using self-harming behaviors. 
Interestingly, Sara came into therapy with a certain degree of understanding of her inner 
dynamics, probably the benefit of earlier psychoanalytic treatment she had received. 
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However, this conceptual-biographical understanding seemed insufficient, as it did not 
prevent her from acting out. The focus of this new round of treatment was building Sara’s 
emotional awareness, with a particular focus on the experiential awareness on a moment-by-
moment basis. 
Case number two: Mark. Mark was a 40-year old client diagnosed with narcissistic 
personality disorder and with several additional criteria met for BPD. This case was published 
by Kramer, Berthoud, Keller and Caspar (2014), with a particular focus on illustrating the 
intervention technique. Mark received a small number of sessions (eight) within a randomized 
controlled trial, where the idiographic intervention of motive-oriented therapeutic relationship 
(Caspar, 2007) was being added to a short psychiatric treatment. One of Mark’s main 
problems was his lack of control over his anger in situations that threatened his identity, such 
as when his five year old daughter wet their tablecloth by accidentally knocking over a glass 
of water: he flew into a wild self-critical rage, feeling inadequate as a parent for not having 
monitoring his child enough. Mark presented with some awareness that the intensity of his 
anger is these situations was disproportionate, but he was unaware what other emotions might 
actually drive his angry outbursts. 
Case number three: Daniel. Daniel was a 55-year old client suffering from 
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. Daniel underwent a 3-year-long course of 
treatment in clarification-oriented psychotherapy, which focused on the underlying affective 
and cognitive elements related to his specific presenting problems (Sachse, Sachse, & 
Fasbender, 2011). These personal issues included his difficulties in standing up for his needs 
(i.e., for example in an intimate relationship) and maintaining personal boundaries in 
interpersonal relationships. His emotional processing style was highly intellectual, and he 
usually described emotions from a very removed or distant perspective. The focus of Daniel’s 
treatment was building his experiential access to his underlying needs, which was central to 
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his difficulties. All three of the aforementioned cases will be illustrated and elaborated on in 
relation with the theoretical aspects described in this paper. 
1. The Feeling Process as a Form of Self-Knowledge 
In formulating the feeling process as a unique form of self-knowledge, we make a 
distinction between the emotional contents of self-knowledge (i.e., answering questions like 
“who am I?”, “What is this feeling?” and “what is there that stands in the way of me doing 
this or that?”) vs. the processes of self-knowledge (i.e., answering questions like “how did I 
become who I am today?”, “how did I get into this particular state? -- how did I get so 
angry?” and “how did I manage to fail/succeed on this task?”). Differentiating emotional 
content from emotional process is central, because doing so enables one to consider the 
broader underlying mechanisms – the “how” of emotional work in therapy – and not just the 
idiographic contents which often vary from one case to another. This emphasis on process is 
in line with Gendlin’s focus on the process of how the implicit becomes explicit in the 
construction of personality (Gendlin, 1964). Process designates here the how of the 
emergence of the explicit self-knowledge in the here and now, and not necessarily the 
developmental construction of a content, although both may abide by similar principles 
explaining change. Emergent narratives about the self (e.g., “I realize now that I am an 
unassertive person”, or “My current problems are caused by my being adopted”) are therefore 
only the final manifestation of a complex inner construction process, which might be subject 
to a number of dynamic influences (Greenberg & Angus, 2003; Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 
1995; Watson & Greenberg, 1996). Generally, it is the narrative that is taken by both the 
client and the therapist as an indicator of a personality pathology, however, we suggest that 
the actual underlying process of meaning construction is flawed and should be the central 
focus.  
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In what follows, we will therefore define emotional self-knowledge as a dynamic 
process of construction, one that takes into account a number of influencing factors: affective, 
cognitive, motivational, developmental, neurobiological, and behavioral. Fundamentally, we 
would argue there are two different ways in which emotional self-knowledge may be 
constructed. Firstly, there is the feeling as an emerging awareness (“bottom-up” experiential 
process), and secondly, there is the understanding of and thinking about emotion (usually a 
“top-down” conceptual process). Subsequent processing also includes the articulation 
between these two basic forms of meaning making that represent emerging vs understanding 
emotion. 
In their chapter on emotional insights, Pascual-Leone and Greenberg (2006) have 
described in detail these two processes for generating emotional self-knowledge. Bottom-up 
processes are experience-near forms of self-knowledge: The client symbolizes a felt 
experience of the here and now, by giving some name or label to an emotional experience, for 
example, acknowledging “I am so sad,” based on a number of bodily felt aspects. Bottom-up 
processes work from concrete experiential contents, with increasing differentiation in the here 
and now of the therapeutic interaction. As such, these moments of self-knowledge are 
anchored in perceptual and emotional processes, rather than more distal conceptual and 
rational ones.  
Top-down processes are experience-distant forms of self-knowledge: The client makes 
conceptual links between past and present, usually in terms of interpersonal aspects of the 
self, whether self-other or self-self, inferred from a broader narrative. For example, a client 
with PD may say, “I realize that my clingy style creates problems, my former boyfriend split 
up with me because of that. My mother doesn’t call me so much anymore, either. I think it 
basically puts people off, and so I spend a lot of time all alone in life.” In this example the 
client accesses a general bird’s-eye view of a particular aspect of experience, one that arches 
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across several situations. Top-down process works across different interactional situations 
establishing links between them; the activity of linking is the part of this process that 
generates self-knowledge. Top-down processes are therefore anchored in conceptual and 
rational processes, rather than perceptual and emotional ones (Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 
2006). Both are central for meaning making and both are helpful in the construction of 
emotional self-knowledge. 
Because the meaning making process of clients is dynamic, ongoing, and aims to be 
internally coherent, in actual practice self-knowledge is unfolded through the interface 
between bottom-up and top-down processes. This integration takes into account both the 
movements described above. The generation of meaning is an iterative and dynamic process, 
a truly new synthesis between bottom-up perceptual-emotional and top-down conceptual-
rational processes. It involves constant checking with the emerging bodily felt processes 
involved (“what do I feel in the body right now and what may this mean?”; pointing towards 
the perceptual processes), along with a general internalized questioning perspective (“What is 
it in me that has brought me into the present situation?”; pointing towards the rational 
processes).  
Emotional processes and contents. The process perspective on construction of 
emotional self-knowledge is central because it helps to understand the emergence of an 
emotional state, particularly when it is so often experienced as a “given” by the person, 
something that is usually far from any logical-narrative account. Clients describe “very 
intense” emotional states, “overwhelming emotions”, “deep grief” and “angry outbursts,” not 
the underlying processes. In clinical .practice, it is therefore important to combine the process 
perspective with some of the contents used, as they are described by persons. This will help 
anchor clinical observations with the process perspective on emotions, as described above. 
The change model of emotion developed by Pascual-Leone and Greenberg (2007) achieves 
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this. It shows a range of emotions that are not only sequentially organized – from the least to 
the most productive –, but also along two major, partially independent, axes, (a) depth of 
emotional processing and (b) approach related action tendencies (i.e. anger, compassion) vs. 
withdraw-related action tendencies (i.e., fear, sadness). For example, an initial emotional 
state, described as global distress, is a rather undifferentiated and non-deep (“shallow”) 
emotional processing state, where the client tends to have high arousal with marked 
withdraw-related action tendencies, but no specific meaning processes (see below), neither 
bottom-up nor top-down. Venting or expressing aroused distress may be comparable to what 
other authors call emotional “abreaction” in trauma therapy (e.g., Hoffman, 2006) or 
emotional “catharsis” (Baron & Richardson, 2004), describing a purging of emotion by a 
highly intensive state (see the original definition by Freud, 1893). These emotional states are 
present in clients with PDs, for example in borderline personality disorder (BPD) early in 
treatment (Berthoud, Kramer, Caspar, & Pascual-Leone, 2015).  
The expression of such emotional states is understood as an important initial stepping 
stone in the process of emotion transformation, but is not sufficient for processing as they do 
not access deeper emotional meanings (Pascual-Leone, 2009). We would assume that the 
latter is only achieved when the individual experientially accesses the underlying primary 
sources of the distress (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). This may be core fear of abandonment, 
shame for fundamental defectiveness or fear of annihilation. Such emotional states, when 
completely accessed, are then a new starting point for a final transformational step, the access 
of unmet needs and the associated meaning construction, in particular the integration of 
bottom-up and top-down processes. This may result in new and productive emotional 
experiences like deep grieving for not having had the parents one wished to have, or 
expressing assertive anger to maintain healthy identity-related boundaries. Defined as such, 
Pascual-Leone (2009) assumes that emotion transformation as a core and generic healing 
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process in human beings which dynamically undoes the pathological process, which is a 
broader conception than the classic psychoanalytic concept of affect transformation (Freud, 
1887-1902) which was observed in certain melancholic or neurotic forms of hysteria and 
denotes the consequence of the defense process related with repression, where initially 
pleasurable experiences are linked with negative affects. Freud discussed the same term later 
(Freud, 1926) in relationship with the change from an unconscious affect to a conscious one. 
The following example (case 1; Sara) will describe a bottom-up process in emotion-
focused therapy. It will become clear that a bottom-up process of meaning construction 
emerges from the actual client’s emotion experienced in the here and now. Sara initially 
presented with an intellectualized understanding of her inner dynamics, in an experience-
distant way, and failed to link this understanding with the emotional experiences she was 
having in-session, which were at times still overwhelming to her. A detailed video-based 
analysis of the emotional states at Sara’s intake session yielded a clear picture (Kramer & 
Pascual-Leone, 2012): there were hardly any moments of aroused emotion in this first session 
of therapy. The contents were presented in a rather shallow processing style, without much 
non-verbal or para-verbal expression (e.g., Sara mentions in a neutral tone of voice: “I know 
that ultimately, I will kill myself”). Despite such dramatic content, our process analysis of that 
session captured only some isolated moments of emotional arousal consistent with global 
distress, as described above. The same in-depth analysis of emotional processing much later 
in therapy after two years of emotion-focused therapeutic work, at session 95, revealed a very 
different picture: Sara presented with a large amount of assertive anger, which she expressed 
during imaginal dialogues (i.e., two-chair task) to her mother. These emotional states involved 
both non-verbal and para-verbal engagement in emotional arousal and a subsequent novel 
meaning construction emerging from this aroused state. In this later session, Sara had an in-
session access to the submissive attitude she adopted facing her mother who formulated 
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boundary-overstepping requests to the client as a child. This helped the client to access as 
deep sense of inner pain which, suddenly, transformed into feelings that signified her 
awareness that the submissive attitude she was forced to take as a child was not justified and 
did not reflect what Sara really wanted in life and what she deserved. In this treatment, such 
emotional awareness is fostered using expressive two chair dialogues (as done in emotion-
focused or Gestalt therapies). Thus, these dialogues are not used for sole expression of the 
unexpressed, but to get at the underlying core feeling in the very moment of doing it. The 
latter feeling will be part of a new meaning construction in relation with a traumatic situation 
from the past, and thus contributes to an emerging knowledge structure. In this 95th session, 
Sara was able to express out loud and imagine saying to her mother in a two-chair dialogue: 
Sara (to imaginary mother): “Do you think there is a race that is superior to another 
race? Those with the money versus the others? … That’s not fair!!” (Sara smiles with 
relief at her therapist) 
Th: “But you are also smiling. I guess, saying this feels good…?” 
Sara: “Oh yes, it does, it really feels good to do this, yeah.” 
Th: “Tell her more.” (indicating imaginary mother) 
Sara: “Let me tell you, it isn’t the ones with money vs the rest of us. That’s no way to 
treat people, just giving more importance to some people… There’s no way that I will 
give in or submit again to people like that, some kind of elite, no! I am an independent 
and strong woman!” 
This expression of anger at a discriminating mother is meaningful for Sara and a key 
moment in her treatment, as this is the first time she asserts herself as a “strong woman” 
facing her mother. Notice the emergence of some relief, underlying the expression of this kind 
of assertive anger. This is a good example of how the expression emotion (i.e., anger) can 
have a direct positive impact on the client, depending on the client’s ability to access and 
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articulate the emerging adaptive information related to those strong feelings (Greenberg, 
2002). In this way the example illustrates bottom-up processes of self-knowledge, where the 
therapist draws attention on non-verbal and bodily anchored aspects of the accompanying 
relief, facilitating the change of emotion with emotion. 
The case of Daniel (case number 3) illustrates top-down processes of emotional 
meaning making in clarification-oriented psychotherapy. Daniel describes his lack of 
assertion facing Cathy, a woman he desires, but to whom he fails to declare his affection. On 
Valentine’s day, he wanted to be with her and called her up, but was unable to propose they 
spend the evening together. He described the situation in the following therapy segment. 
Th: “I would like to come back to your phone call with Cathy.” 
Daniel (moves back on his chair and manifests discomfort.) 
Th: “What happens inside you, imagine you are in that situation, you want to see 
Cathy, it’s Valentine’s Day and as you start to get off the phone you say to her ‘Have a 
good night.’ So, you go to hang up the phone, but what is happening inside you?” 
Daniel (sighs deeply) 
Th. “You sigh, what’s happening inside you?” 
Daniel (with cracking voice) “I don’t know what to do with this situation, I’m lost.” 
Th: “You feel like…” 
Daniel: “I feel embarrassment. These are my, I would call them my self-destroying 
moments in my life.” 
Th: “You destroy yourself.” 
Daniel: “Self-destroying moments, yes. It’s that I am a masochist. Sometimes, I do 
such negative things to myself, destroy myself and I suffer from this.” 
While the therapist tends to focus on the here and now, in order to be able access the 
underlying assumptions and emotions which hold Daniel back from expressing his desire to 
EMOTIONAL SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN PERSONALITY DISORDERS 13 
Cathy, the client certainly describes his embarrassment, but then elaborates a more general 
theory of his interpersonal functioning (“I am a masochist”). These two aspects (feeling 
embarrassed and the acknowledgment of being a masochist) together were important initial 
steps in the construction of emotional self-knowledge, however, at this point of the session, it 
was unclear to the client what the actual link between the two were.  
2. Self-knowledge as Facilitated by Client-Therapist Interaction 
Consistent with the emotion-focused perspective we adopt in the present paper, we 
assume that self-knowledge in psychotherapy is a complex and dynamic construction process 
taking place within the client. This process may be fostered, or hindered, by moment-by-
moment and recursive client-therapist interaction. This conception is at odds with the 
fundamental assumption generally made in randomized controlled methodology that a 
specific therapist intervention “produces” specific outcome effects (Carey & Stiles, in press). 
We rather assume that the client constructs him-/herself some of the self-knowledge that is 
central for change and there are certain types of therapist interventions which contribute – 
from a process-perspective “implicitly” – to the construction of emotional self-knowledge 
from either a bottom-up or top-down perspective. In addition to the facilitating interventions 
detailed here, there are alternative therapist techniques addressing meaning construction 
processes in relationship with emotions, for example in mindfulness adapted for clients with 
personality disorders (Ottavi, Passarella, Pasinetti, Salvatore, & Dimaggio, 2016), in schema 
therapy for borderline personality disorder (Arntz & Van Genderen, 2010) and in meta-
cognitive interpersonal therapy for clients with personality disorders (Dimaggio, 2015). For 
example, for the latter approach, specific interpersonal episodes – recruiting resources in auto-
biographical memory – are collected and explored with regard to the core emotions 
(Dimaggio, Montano, Popolo, & Salvatore, 2015). Despite the technical focus on emotions, 
their underlying intervention theory is either behavioral, cognitive or interpersonal, and not 
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emotion-focused, as proposed by our framework. In what follows, we will review emotion-
focused therapeutic options of how such self-knowledge processes may be directly fostered in 
therapy for clients with PDs. 
Facilitating self-knowledge bottom-up. In order to facilitate the emergence of 
experience-near self-knowledge, Gendlin (1996) developed a therapeutic procedure called 
focusing. The principle of experiential focusing is the client’s sustained attention to inner 
feelings, in particular the bodily felt sense and giving this feeling the possibility to being 
symbolized. The process of symbolization may be achieved either by a word, by an image or 
a metaphor the client lets emerge out of the process. Such a process yields a transformation of 
the initial feeling in the client, called a “felt shift,” towards a different, more complex, 
meaning state. This new state integrates hitherto non-accessed contents which now make 
sense to the client. Focusing might be particularly useful when the client does not have direct 
access to inner feelings (Hendricks, 2009). Focusing instruction may therefore be used for 
clients with PDs, in particular when the therapist takes into account the client’s style of 
processing. It fosters bottom-up processing, because focusing let “speak” the bodily felt 
senses in a specific and unpredictable way. 
In client-centered psychotherapy, Rice and Saperia (1984) have examined the 
construction of meaning when the client presents with a problematic reaction point. The latter 
is a particular emotional-cognitive state marked by a narration about a reaction the client had 
in the recent past which he/she assesses as “unusual,” “strange,” or “problematic.” In therapy, 
this problematic reaction point becomes the center of attention until its resolution. A number 
of steps, involving both client and therapist activity, were described in this context 
(Greenberg, Rice, & Elliott, 1993). A particularly central piece here is the construction by the 
client of a “meaning bridge” (Rice & Saperia, 1984). A meaning bridge can be a word (or a 
different kind of symbol) that connects the initial “problematic” state with the underlying, 
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more generic, understanding of this initial state. Our clinical experience has been that these 
therapeutic procedures may be helpful for clients with PDs, however, so far, formal empirical 
demonstration of its efficacy is lacking for this population. The emergence of a meaning-
bridge is a bottom-up process, because of its emergence “out” of the problematic state. 
Facilitating self-knowledge top-down. Whereas top-down processes of self-
knowledge may occur in all therapies, they are most typical in psychodynamic psychotherapy, 
probably due to the identification of situation-overarching patterns of relationships (Pascual-
Leone & Greenberg, 2006), based on transference and counter-transference hypotheses 
construction central to psychodynamic psychotherapies (Gelso, Kivlighan, Wine, Jones, & 
Friedman, 1997; Hoglend, 2014). The studies trying to relate the number of interpretations 
with therapeutic outcome generally fail to find the simple and direct link that has been first 
hypothesized (e.g., Johansson et al., 2010). In order to overcome these difficulties, it was 
suggested that there might be “something more” than therapist interpretations which actually 
drives the outcome in dynamic psychotherapy. Stern and colleagues (1998; Boston Change 
Process Study Group, 2008) have defined the notion of implicit relational knowledge which 
described the way client and therapist interact, their mutual gazes, their adjusted postures and 
moment-by-moment synchronies and de-synchronies on the non-verbal level. These authors 
assumed that this implicit relational knowledge is a generalized way of being together, and is 
co-constructed within the early therapeutic interaction and may function as secure context for 
later stages of the treatment. Even though this relational knowledge works on implicit levels 
within the client, we would still assume it as being constructed from a generalized and quite 
experience-distant perspective within the client, thus falling into the category of fostering a 
top-down process to emotional self-knowledge.  This is because it is assumed that the primary 
piece of information in this conception is a generalized pattern of interaction, rather than a 
moment-by-moment experience. 
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A top-down case formulation by the therapist may facilitate bottom-up processes. 
Between the facilitation of top-down processes and bottom-up processes, an articulated 
perspective is possible. By assuming that underlying principles of action, “Plans,” organize 
the client’s behavior and experience, the “Plan Analysis” approach to case formulation can be 
seen as a combination of the two perspectives (Caspar, 2007). For this method, the therapist 
formulates behavior- and experience-underlying Plans and uses this over-arching – and top-
down – formulation to tailor the relationship offer to each particular client. This relationship-
tailoring is called motive-oriented therapeutic relationship and encompasses a number of 
individually-tailored heuristics which are implemented on the moment-by-moment process-
level, in adjustment to the client’s activated processes. When done appropriately, it may result 
in a new implicit (or explicit) relational experience in the client, an experience that may be 
contradictory to his/her central assumptions about relationships, hence producing a type of 
corrective experience in its own right (Alexander & French, 1945). This may be achieved in 
an implicit way, without necessarily reaching the client’s awareness (see case number 2 
below). Research on a sample of inpatients with major depression in interpersonal 
psychotherapy has shown that non-verbal aspects of therapist adjustment to client’s activated 
Plans (e.g., the therapist giving control to the client who manifests a strong motive for control 
in the process, by encouraging the client with a head movement to take initiative in the 
session) was related with symptom change, whereas the verbal adjustment (such as 
encouraging to take initiative by making this aspect explicit) was not (Caspar, Grossmann, 
Unmüssig, & Schramm, 2005). The same hypothesis was tested in a sample of clients with 
major depression and co-morbid personality disorders undergoing psychodynamic 
psychotherapy (Kramer et al., 2011). This study failed to confirm the role of the motive-
oriented therapeutic relationship for clients with major depression only, but a significant 
effect was found for clients presenting with a co-morbid Clusters B and C PDs (Kramer et al., 
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2011): therapists focusing non-verbally and para-verbally on the client’s activated underlying 
motives was related with more symptom decrease at the end of treatment.  
The case of Mark illustrates how such a top-down formulation can facilitate bottom-up 
construction of emotional self-knowledge. Mark had the experience of a specific implicit 
corrective relationship in the here and now of his interaction with the therapist, which enabled 
him to open up more in the emotional process (for details see Kramer, Berthoud, et al., 2014). 
What was first expressed as reactive anger (in an abrupt response to his daughter’s spilling 
water on the tablecloth) later transformed in a key session into the articulation of an 
underlying identity-related emotion (i.e., shame-anxiety that his daughter will not evolve 
perfectly, and that he may be inadequate as a parent). Mark acknowledges this in session 4 of 
the therapy: 
Mark: “I am so afraid … when I see kids on the road, 14-15 years old, … it freaks me 
out. I want to pass my values on to my daughter, teach her respect, everything. But it’s 
true, I am too much a man of principles, as you say, the glass of water is always half 
empty, it’s true. Little things drive me crazy. I push too hard, like if she’s not perfect, 
it’s just not good enough” (Kramer, Berthoud, et al., 2014; p. 78). 
This emotional meaning differentiated further, towards underlying attachment-related 
issues, based on the fear that the daughter will eventually not be with the client anymore 
(Kramer, Berthoud, et al., 2014, pp. 78-79): 
Mark: “When [my daughter] disobeys, I get so afraid… (pause) I am so afraid she 
might go away, leave me behind. I don’t want her to go away.” 
Th: “Mhm”. 
Mark: (pause)…. “I feel an emotion coming up in me, right here (points to his 
chest)… I don’t want her to go away (he cries). 
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Th: Mhm…yeah, mhm…yeah. (soothing voice) “Your daughter is so important to 
you.” 
Mark: (pause) “Like I said, I think about bad things sometimes. When Michelle (his 
daughter) cries because she hurt herself, I feel the hurt inside of me (cries)…. I don’t 
want her to go away.” 
Mark: “It’s like somebody has robbed me of my own childhood” (cries). 
Th: “What does this mean to you, as you say this?” 
Mark: “I didn’t have a good childhood” (holds back his tears).  
This excerpt illustrates how very early on in therapy, it can be central to assess and 
promote emotional awareness. In this case, emotional micro-change can be observed as 
moving from the expression of shallow forms of anger (i.e., rejecting anger) to the 
experiential access of a deeper form of shame about being an inadequate father, which then 
transforms into underlying primary hurt, further connected with core biographical issues 
related with being left alone in life. This process was fostered by the specific interaction style 
of the therapist, marked by non-verbal tentativeness and encouragement of vulnerable primary 
experiences (e.g., “soothing voice”; Kramer, Berthoud, et al., 2014). This interaction style 
potentiates a common change principle in psychotherapy: therapist responsiveness, denoting 
the mutual influence of two interaction partners, promoting ultimate change. This principle 
provides a broad explanation for why such moment-by-moment adjustment to client 
characteristics, as illustrated in the case of Mark, is effective in facilitating the client’s 
bottom-up self-knowledge.  
Responsiveness as a generic change principle in treatments of PDs. The principle 
of therapist responsiveness not only helps explain the effects of psychotherapies for PDs, 
including on emotional self-knowledge, it also draws researcher’s attention to central 
problems encountered in psychotherapy research, which often attempts to link therapist 
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interventions to outcome, sometimes without fully taking into account the client’s changing 
process characteristics (Stiles, Honos-Webb & Surko, 1998). These therapist interventions are 
influenced by the emerging context: the client’s changing manifestations in the here and now. 
Emotional processing characteristics, and their associated qualities of emotional self-
knowledge, might be particularly central client variables prone to responsiveness effects. For 
example, a client with borderline personality disorder who accesses, in the here and now of a 
therapy session, inner hurt about being left behind in her life may evoke compassion in the 
therapist, which he or she may express in various ways. A client with narcissistic personality 
disorder who accesses a need for recognition as being “someone useful” in society, and have 
an important role, may be emotionally touching for the therapist (see McMain, Boritz and 
Leybman, 2015).  
3. Components of Emotional Self-Knowledge in Personality Disorders 
What are the specific processes related with emotional self-knowledge in PDs? 
Different processes related to emotional self-knowledge have been associated with the 
experience of clients with PDs, which in turn are related to improved treatment outcomes. In 
this section, we will review some of the literature from an integrative emotion-focused 
perspective. 
In general, the literature describes a number of secondary emotional states for clients 
with PD, sometimes present as formal psychiatric symptoms, which are linked to maladaptive 
ways of dealing with core emotions. For example, clients with PD may present with angry 
outbursts, blaming, and hostile comments towards the therapist. Their anger is not self-
directed but is often non-specific in its meaning, these clients do not know what they are 
really fighting for in their angry state, rather the anger is generally addressed at others, and it 
is usually a secondary rejecting anger (Pascual-Leone, Gillis, Singh, & Andreescu, 2013). 
Such an emotional state may cover (and trigger immediately) underlying (maladaptive) sense 
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of shame, around the notions of “I am never good enough” or “I’m a no-good father” (see the 
example of Mark). This state is very difficult to tolerate for the individual, so clients tend to 
switch quite rapidly back into a secondary rejecting anger, which offers little benefit to 
therapeutic change, but is used by clients to defend against vulnerability. Such circular 
dynamics between shame and secondary (rejecting) anger are present in both Sara and Mark. 
This specific emotional dynamic has been studied as part of interpersonal violence (Dutton, 
Ginkel, Starzomski, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). According to an 
emotion-focused perspective, the underlying primary shame needs to be experientially 
accessed (i.e., felt by the client in the therapy room), before a transformation towards 
underlying primary adaptive emotional states can take place (Greenberg, 2002). We argue that 
the emotion transformation process is characterized by an integrative generation process of 
self-knowledge, as such combining both bottom-up and top-down processes of meaning 
making. 
This usually fluid and dynamic construction process of self-knowledge is based on 
experientially accessed emotion (Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2001) but tends to go awry in 
clients with PDs. The reason for this may be associated with their shallow processing of 
experience, vagueness in the narrative, the use of experiences in efforts to create interpersonal 
influence, or problems related with emotion regulation (i.e., impairments in either under-
regulation or over-regulation), which will be reviewed below. 
Shallow processing of experience is a marked difficulty in clients with PDs, for which 
alexithymic personality traits may be the most common clinical expression. Alexithymia 
denotes a basic deficiency in symbolizing emotions and elaborating based on emotional 
experience (Nemiah et al., 1976). Ogrodniczuk, Piper and Joyce (2011) showed that across 
samples with personality disorders, clients had a deficit in their ability to adequately 
symbolize emotional experience. Furthermore, an experimental study demonstrated the link 
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between PDs and alexithymia is partially independent from the actual symptom load: even 
among clients with PDs who have rather low symptom levels present with alexithymic 
features, speaking towards a central feature of emotional knowledge processes in these clients 
(De Panfilis, Ossola, Tonna, Catania, & Marchesi, 2015). Clients with such alexithymic 
features may still describe emotions, but in a non-differentiated way, sometimes even despite 
their being “high-arousal” states, consistent with what has been called global distress 
(Pascual-Leone, 2009). Alexithymic persons do neither have access to content nor process 
aspects of emotional self-knowledge, therefore no meaning construction process can take 
place. Another form of shallow processing of experience are intellectualized (and seemingly 
accurate) descriptions of emotional states. These intellectual descriptions seem to overlap 
with what Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002) called pseudo-mentalizing, where the 
experiential, bottom-up, information is ignored or discarded. This was present as main 
presenting problem in the case of Sara, at intake, and for Daniel as his overall processing 
style. 
The vagueness of emotional experiences as an impediment to self-knowledge in PDs is 
echoed in research on the role of pathological worry and rumination observed in Cluster C 
PDs. By using client self-reports, Spinhoven, Bamelis, Molendijk, Haringsma, and Arntz 
(2009) showed that individuals diagnosed with cluster C PDs reported higher rates of worry 
as compared to controls. Furthermore, this shallow and verbal form of worry mediated the 
relationship between their PDs and the specificity observed in their autobiographical 
memories. Thus, heightened worry corresponded to recalling more overgeneralized memories 
as well as significantly fewer personal memories, both of which represent less emotionally 
evocative meaning exploration. These results relate to Pascual-Leone and Greenberg’s (2006) 
description of the here-and-now affective and perceptual components to bottom-up insight 
and awareness. These findings on the kinds of overgeneralized memories recalled by 
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individuals with cluster C PDs (Dimaggio, Salvatore, Popolo, & Lysaker, 2012) points to less 
perceptual detail and a reduced sense of bottom-up re-experiencing (c.f. Pascual-Leone and 
Greenberg, 2006). 
Use of experiences for interpersonal influence may be partly a consequence of shallow 
emotional processing. However, they may also describe a mental state with the result of a 
particular focus on impacting (external) interpersonal interaction. Greenberg (2002) has 
described this emotion type as “instrumental” where a specific interpersonal effect is 
anticipated as a result of the expression of a particular emotional state. For example, the client 
may express anxiety to his or her partner, in order to assure that the partner reacts in a 
particularly empathic way. For clients with PDs, Sachse and colleagues (2011) have defined 
the notion of interpersonal manoeuvers, with a dozen specifically described forms of such 
manoeuvers. The latter are biographically learned action and interactional patterns designed 
(either implicitly or explicitly) to have an interpersonal effect. A client with narcissistic 
personality disorder, for example, might present as a surprisingly invincible and non-
vulnerable person, expecting from the interaction partner to confirm self-images of 
grandiosity, strength, and power. This was the case for Mark, to a moderate extent. Kramer 
and Sachse (2013) have shown that the degree to which the interpersonal manoeuvers were 
present at the intake session can be used as a marker for the likelihood of symptom change in 
clients with BPD: the more interpersonal manoeuvres, the smaller the chance of symptom 
relief. Because interpersonal manoeuvres tend to have an “external” focus (i.e., on the 
interaction), the experientially valuable information on the internal emotional processes of 
this client is not being used for generating new awareness, i.e., on self-knowledge. This 
external focus may also explain results of experimental research demonstrating that clients 
with BPD present with enhanced cognitive capacities of inferring about other people’s minds, 
as compared to healthy controls (see the experimental research by Fertuck, et al., 2009, using 
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the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; see also Dinsdale & Crespi, 2013 and Scott, Levy, 
Adams & Stevenson, 2011). 
Dysregulated emotional experience is a hallmark feature of BPD (Linehan, Bohus, & 
Lynch, 2007), and may be present in a number of other PDs (McMain et al., 2010). Over-
regulation of emotional experience, known as emotional restriction, may also be found in 
clients with any PD (Popolo et al., 2014); this formulation has been elaborated as a problem 
area for example BPD (Kramer & Pascual-Leone, 2012; Pos & Greenberg, 2012) and 
avoidant personality disorder (Pos, 2014, 2015). In more severe cases of PD and in 
association with interpersonal traumatic history, both over-regulation and dys-regulation of 
emotional experiences may be present, side by side, in the same client depending on the 
content area (Paivio & Pascual-Leone, 2010). As a result, these individuals often switch 
between a constricted emotional processing mode and feeling over-whelmed by poorly 
integrated emotional processing state. 
The present overview of studies on components of emotional self-knowledge in clients 
with PDs illustrates also how difficult it is to access these specific features in a study using 
appropriate methodology. Whereas self-reported questionnaire present problems of construct 
validity, single case studies and clinical descriptions may compensate for these problems, but 
are then limited by their restricted generalizability. Experimental research on emotion may 
solve some of these problems, but then tend to suffer from limited ecological validity and 
clinical relevance. Observer-rated assessment of emotion awareness, or of distinct subjective 
emotion states, might be a possible assessment strategy that takes these constraints optimally 
into account. Methodological recommendations with regard to the experimental study of 
emotion, by taking into account the subjective experience of the client, have been put forward 
by Pascual-Leone, Herpertz and Kramer (2016). 
4. Change in emotional self-knowledge within treatments for personality disorders 
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 The understanding of emotional self-knowledge as a change process (i.e., how it 
emerges, and how it contributes to change) over treatment is only beginning to be empirically 
explored. There is an emerging literature, conducted from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, on change in emotion regulation, in emotion awareness, in cognitive markers of 
affective change and on emotion transformation that occurs in treatments for PDs. Most 
empirical data stem from secondary analyses of randomized controlled trials for treatments of 
BPD, creating a necessarily skewed formulation that is not likely to be generalizable to all 
PDs. 
A first attempt to operationalize change in emotional self-knowledge is a focus on 
emotion regulation. McMain and colleagues (2010; Herpertz, 2011; Linehan et al., 2007) 
have argued that emotion regulation is a central therapeutic task of clients presenting with 
BPD. In an exploratory process study on data stemming from a randomized controlled trial, 
McMain, Links, Guimond, Wnuk, Eynan, Bergmans and Warwar (2013) demonstrated that 
Dialectical-Behavior Therapy (DBT), as well as general psychiatric treatment, brought about 
increasingly better capacities of cognitive problem solving and emotional balance in BPD. 
From a neurobiological perspective on emotion regulation, Schnell and Herpertz (2007) 
showed after inpatient DBT increased inhibitory functions associated with brain areas 
responsible for emotion arousal (i.e., specific regions associated with the amygdala and the 
insula) at the end of treatment, and this was not the case for control subjects. Schmitt, Winter, 
Niedtfeld, Schmahl and Herpertz (2013) demonstrated that DBT treatment was associated 
with increased neural pre-frontal-amygdalar connectivity for clients responding to treatment. 
This result was interpreted as the client’s increased capacity of emotion regulation associated 
with DBT. Again using a sample with BPD, Neacsiu, Rizvi and Linehan (2010) showed that 
the everyday use of behavioral skills facing disruptive emotional states functioned as mediator 
of change in DBT. From this behavioral perspective, emotional processing implies the 
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regulation and control of "disruptive" emotional states which are fundamentally understood as 
being too intense. As such, healthy functioning in this conceptualization means that the 
emotion intensity is down-regulated. It is unclear, however, to what extent such down-
regulation of emotion – or balancing out of emotion – is accompanied by increased emotion 
awareness and emotional self-knowledge. More research should investigate this point. 
Greenberg and Pascual-Leone (2006) have argued that emotion regulation is central 
for therapeutic change, but other operations applied to emotion are equally central, as well, in 
particular from the perspective of the construction of self-knowledge. In particular, emotion 
awareness, the integration between cognitive and affective aspects related to the perception of 
one’s own emotion, along with emotion transformation, were discussed. Ogrodniczuk, Joyce 
and Piper (2013) focused on emotion awareness and demonstrated in a sample where 31% 
presented with avoidant PD that therapeutic change was related to decreases in client’s levels 
of alexithymia. This study used two forms of psychodynamic psychotherapy. What is more, 
there were a number of cognitive variables which are understood as correlates of the emotion 
awareness in clients with PD as they undergo different forms of psychotherapy. A client’s 
mentalizing capacity, a concept encompassing both emotional awareness and aspects of 
regulation, may be defined as “the way humans make sense of their social world by imagining 
the mental states (e.g., beliefs, motives, emotions, desires, and needs) that underpin their own 
and others’ behaviors in interpersonal interactions” (Choi-Kain et al., 2008, p. 1127). This 
capacity was assumed to play a central role in generating emotion (and cognitive) awareness 
in treatments for PDs (Fonagy et al., 2002). Levy and colleagues (2006) have investigated 
three forms of psychotherapy for BPD, Transference-Focused Psychotherapy (TFP), DBT and 
supportive therapy within a randomized design and found that only TFP was significantly 
associated with increases in mentalizing capacities, along with the development of more 
secure attachment patterns. These results might suggest that change in mentalizing capacities 
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is specific to certain types of psychodynamic treatments, specifically focusing on the 
transference-countertransference issues. 
From a slightly different theoretical viewpoint, Semerari and colleagues (2005) put 
forward the notion of “meta-representation”, an over-arching concept that is divisible into 
sub-functions, such as differentiation of cognitive and emotional processes and decentration 
from the experience. In this sense, both – mentalizing and meta-representation – may help 
identify problems in the meaning generation related to emotional self-knowledge, and may 
help identify specific sub-processes of meta-representation that go awry in this process. 
Change in such representational processes may be observed in the client’s in-session speech. 
For such changes in two treatments for Cluster B and C PDs (schema-focused and 
clarification-oriented), Arntz, Hawke, Bamelis, Spinhoven and Molendijk (2012) used a 
lexical analysis to show that after treatment, clients used more positive emotional words, less 
negative emotional words, as well as less negations. Decrease in the latter two categories was 
also linked with symptom change in the end of treatment, showing a process-to-outcome 
relationship. Treatment related cognitive change was found across therapies for PDs. In a pilot 
study using the motive-oriented therapeutic relationship described above, Kramer, Caspar and 
Drapeau (2013) showed that this treatment component, brought about a specific decrease in 
negative biased thinking in clients with BPD. This decrease was observed in particular in the 
lessening of the over-generalizing thoughts, as they underlie in-session cognitive-affective 
processing of central contents. These results may suggest that change in cognitive awareness 
of affect, as observed in session, may occur in a similar fashion across treatment forms. The 
studies also show that the process perspective of describing experience (“the how”) is a 
productive avenue of research. 
Research carried out on emotion transformation – a process fundamentally moving 
towards meaning making – has shown specific changes. In a randomized controlled study on 
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DBT skills group training aiming at developing at a more efficient emotion regulation in 
clients with BPD, a study focused on change in anger (Kramer, Pascual-Leone, Berthoud, et 
al., 2016). The authors differentiated between secondary rejecting anger (i.e., with an external 
focus and with rather low individual meaning) and a more advanced form of anger marked by 
emotional self-knowledge, the primary assertive anger. The latter presents with an internal 
focus, characterized with an awareness of what the individual was angry about. As such, it is a 
“deeper” type of emotion processing, assumed to be underpinned by approach-related action 
tendencies and more elaborated self-knowledge than in rejecting anger. The results showed an 
increase in such assertive anger for the clients who received a DBT skills group, compared to 
no change in assertive anger for the clients who did not receive the treatment. This change in 
assertive anger mediated the reduction of problems related to social role. Because this study 
focused on two different emotion categories, it remains an open question how the assertive 
anger is emerging over the course of therapy, i.e., what therapeutic variables facilitate this 
productive emotional state. 
In a sample of clients with mostly narcissistic and histrionic PDs, Kramer, Pascual-
Leone, Rohde and Sachse (2016) showed that the clients who were in the working phase of 
clarification-oriented psychotherapy and who would later have good outcomes, presented with 
self-soothing emotions and rejecting anger. Whereas the latter may be associated with the 
expression of the specific psychopathology of clients with PD (see above, and the case of 
Mark), the former is an integrative process where specific meaning on the underlying missing 
need is formed and how a client may soothe him or herself given certain emotional hurts. The 
therapist fostering client’s experiential access to underlying fear and/or shame was understood 
as central in this form of therapy, therefore, the authors micro-analyzed the interaction process 
leading up to those emotional states. They found that the therapist process directivity, i.e., the 
close moment-by-moment following and guiding the here and now process towards the 
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central inner focus, was related with the emergence of shame and fear later in the same 
session. Emotion transformation helps to give some understanding into the actual process of 
change in emotional self-knowledge taking place in the client during a therapy session. Such 
research might help us understand the pieces – or process steps – necessary for the client to 
build emotional self-knowledge, understood here as a dynamic process of construction. 
These studies point into the direction that an emotion-focused conception of self-
knowledge may be fruitful for understanding change in clients with PD undergoing 
psychotherapy. It might be a particularly fruitful conception, because of its integrative nature: 
a number of clients with PDs present with difficulties in emotion awareness and the 
productive use of in-session emotional information is attempted across several forms of 
therapy for PD; therapists may choose between fostering a bottom-up experiential process and 
fostering a top-down experience-distant process. It seems that the construction of emotional 
self-knowledge is characterized by increased awareness, emotion change, and emotion 
transformation. It is unclear if the regulation of emotion also helps the construction of such 
emotional self-knowledge, although it seems that excessive arousal or a poor ability to 
regulate is always a factor that could prevent or derail the construction of emotional self-
knowledge. 
Conclusions 
 Components, steps and pieces of emotional self-knowledge, and how they interact to 
form new meaning within the client, may be examined from the perspective of a constructive 
and iterative process, in combination with experiential contents described by the actual client. 
As such, the process perspective on emotional meaning making is complemented by a content 
perspective. Process features observed in clients with PDs, like the shallow processing of 
experience, the vagueness of emotional experience and the use of specific experience for 
interpersonal influence, may be found in certain emotion categories, such as the state of 
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global distress, as defined by Pascual-Leone and Greenberg (2007). We may assume that 
transformation towards accessing fully the primary experience is underpinned with a deep and 
elaborated emotional self-knowledge, together contributing to therapeutic change. 
 Emotional self-knowledge – the moment-by-moment awareness of one’s own 
emotions and extracting adaptive information – is a central productive process in treatments 
for clients with PD, in particular on three levels. Firstly, emotional self-knowledge may 
contribute to alleviate problems related to aspects of identity, such as needs, in PDs (Livesley, 
2016, 2012; Kramer, Pascual-Leone et al., 2016): the client, by becoming aware and 
accessing underlying needs, may more easily stand up for him-/herself and defend a strong 
identity within a social context. Secondly, emotional self-knowledge may contribute to 
alleviate problems related to interpersonal relationships in PDs: the client, by becoming aware 
and accessing attachment-related emotions, may more easily open up to intimate partners and 
other significant person, thus possibly having more fulfilling and authentic relationships. 
Thirdly, emotional self-knowledge may contribute to alleviate problems in global functioning 
in PDs: the client, by becoming aware and accessing his/her underlying primary emotions, 
may be able to function more accurately in key social contexts. Finally, our review has also 
outlined some specific types of intervention, for example the ones consistent with the 
principle of therapist responsiveness (Stiles et al., 1998) – and there are certainly others –
which tend to facilitate the processes of emotional self-knowledge in clients with PDs.  
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